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I. Introduction
The results of the Sixth WTO Conference
were, indeed, modest, as had been predicted
in the forecast on the eve of the Hong Kong
meeting3.  A failure was however averted,
one that would have had highly negative
consequences for the future of negotiations
and for the credibility of multilateralism and
the very World Trade Organization. 
The Ministerial Declaration agreed upon on
December 18, 2005 incorporates some
concrete results achieved during the week of
negotiations.  Noteworthy among these are: i)
the 2013 date for the elimination of all forms
of export subsidies on agricultural exports ii)
commitments on certain aspects of negotiation
on cotton, and  iii) the granting of access to the
markets of developed countries – duty and
quota free – for some 97% of products from
the least developed countries (LDCs).
Predictably, it was impossible to iron out
the major and politically more sensitive
discrepancies that persist in the three
fundamental pillars of this agricultural
negotiation. The Ministers therefore
incorporated into the Declaration certain
guidelines and pointers for resolving some of
the pending problems and set April 20, 2006
as the deadline for establishing the modalities
of the new commitments to be adopted
in agriculture (structure of the formulas
and specific levels for tariff reduction, domestic
support and subsidies).   They also committed
themselves to submitting by July 31, 2006 the
draft schedules based on these modalities. The
Ministers renewed their political commitment
to successfully conclude this Round of
negotiations by the end of 2006.
Essentially, the muted outcome reflects little
progress in the negotiations launched in
Doha four years ago.  Nonetheless for those
of us who always maintained that what was
important was not what happened in Hong Kong –
which is only one stage in the negotiation process –
but rather what we could expect at the end of the
Round, these results may be perceived as a step
–albeit a tenuous one – in the right direction.  In
fact, this Conference gives renewed political impetus
to the negotiation process which had been stymied;
it does not sacrifice to any degree the ambitious
forecast in the original negotiation mandate agreed
upon by the Ministers in Doha; it sets very ambitious
deadlines for achieving results on the many pending
issues and it reaffirms the commitment to conclude
the Round by next year.  It is therefore a road map
enabling us to move forward.
Undoubtedly, the agreed objective poses a huge
challenge for all Members.  Personally, I continue to
be cautiously optimistic about the possibility of
achieving a satisfactory result by the end of 2006,
early 2007.
This means that the negotiation process must resume
in Geneva immediately and that on the basis of the
results and directives of the Sixth Conference, as well
as the excellent Report by the Chairman of the
Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture to
the TNC, published as Annex A to the Ministerial
Declaration, we keep the impetus, dynamics and pace
of the negotiations going, as we seek areas of
understanding and converging positions, without
which there can be no outcome.  The Chairman of
the General Council and the Director-General of the
WTO would also have to structure a horizontal
modality of negotiations in the various areas that
make up this Round so that we can move forward in
step in all fields.  This would make it easier to strike
a balance in the global context of the negotiation and
not exclusively in any one area or sector.   
As for the possible outcome of these negotiations, I
believe that the document submitted by IICA to the
Sixth Ministerial Conference, “The Agriculture of
the Americas in the context of the Doha
Development Agenda” continues to be fully valid
and could be a useful point of reference for designing
the modalities
II. Evaluation of the results 
Our evaluation of the specific results achieved in
Hong Kong may be summarized as follows:
A. Export competition
For purposes of the negotiation, this topic has four
components that need to be addressed:  i) export
subsidies; ii) export credit; iii) food aid; and iv)
export state trading enterprises.  In addition to this,
there is the issue of special and differential treatment
for developing countries.
The first result emanating from the Hong Kong
Ministerial Declaration is the reinforcement of the
need for the parallel elimination of all forms of
export subsidies referred to earlier.  All export
measures  that could involve elements of
subsidization, or that have an equivalent effect, will
be eliminated or subject to disciplines in a process to
be completed by the end of 2013.
1. Export subsidies
The agreed decision to set 2013 as the date for the
final elimination of all export subsidies is
undoubtedly the most concrete result of this Sixth
Ministerial Conference.
By and large, the developing countries as well as the
developed countries in the Cairns Group had
staunchly defended the need to eliminate these
subsidies by 2010.  The finally agreed date is a
commitment to address the difficulties of the
European Union.  In fact, the 2003 reform of the
Common Agricultural Policy visualizes the
elimination of most of these subsidies by 2013.  
The noted tendency in the last decade is towards a
decline in export subsidies worldwide, and
specifically at the European Union which accounts
for more than 90 per cent of the total.  In fact, it is
estimated that, in recent years, these subsidies have
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varied between US$2.3 and US$3.4 million and
have concentrated on a few products, especially,
sugar, milk products and meat.
The Declaration recognizes, however, that the
modalities to be agreed upon must specify that a
substantial part of the elimination of subsidies
must be concluded by the first half of the
implementation period. Without question, the
elimination of export subsidies on agricultural
products will be a significant step forward in
including agriculture in the same norms and
disciplines as the other tradable goods at the
WTO.  It bears recalling that more than 40 years
ago, the GATT prohibited export subsidies for
industrial products.  This outcome is therefore fair
and equitable. 
In light of this, it might well have been more
logical and reasonable to agree upon a closer date
for the elimination of subsidies.  However, this
outcome will be important for agriculture
worldwide and, especially, for those countries that
are efficient producers of certain agricultural
products that have been displaced from their
traditional markets and that have experienced a
drop in world prices as a result of the application
of these subsidies by developed countries.  Also,
many developing countries that clearly have the
potential to produce agricultural products, but
that had been discouraged by the entry on their
markets of highly subsidized products with which
they could not compete, will now be encouraged
to  engage in agricultural production in the
medium term.
2. Export credits, export credit 
guarantees and insurance programs.
The purpose of these negotiations is to eliminate
concealed elements of subsidization in these
operations which, like export subsidies, represent
unfair competition.
The Declaration notes emerging convergence on
some elements of disciplines with respect to export
credits, export credit guarantees or insurance
programmes with repayment periods of 180 days
and below.
The Ministers agreed that such programmes
should be self-financing, reflecting market
consistency, and that the period should be of a
sufficiently short duration so as not to effectively
circumvent real commercially-oriented discipline.
The Declaration agreed that the disciplines on these
measures, used for the purpose of improving their
competitiveness in exporting agricultural products
(the United States is the country that has most used
these practices), should be completed by April 30,
2006 as part of the modalities to be negotiated. 
To ensure the progressivity and the parallelism
agreed upon for the elimination of export subsidies,
these disciplines will ensure the elimination of all
elements of subsidization of export credit,
guarantees and insurance programs by 2013 as well.
3. Food Aid
This topic provoked a lengthy debate at the Hong
Kong Conference, particularly between the two
major trading partners, the United States and the
European Union.  The European Union considers
the use of food aid as a means of placing surpluses
or developing new markets has the equivalent
effect of subsidies.
The Declaration reconfirms the commitment to
maintain an adequate level of food aid and to take
into account the interests of the food aid recipient
countries.  To that end, it will provide a “safe box”
for bona fide food aid to ensure that there is no
impediment to dealing with emergency situations.
Effective disciplines will also be agreed upon on
in-kind food aid, monetization and re-exports so
that there can be no loop-hole for continuing
export subsidization
The Members of the WTO must also agree to
disciplines on food aid by April 30, 2006 as part of
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the modalities to be negotiated by that date.  These
disciplines will ensure the elimination of all elements
of subsidies that food aid operations could conceal,
which should be completed by early 2013.
4. State Trading Enterprises
This was also a polemic issue at the Conference since
the major countries using these enterprises,
especially, Canada and Australia, felt that the
monopolistic character of these enterprises  and the
distortion of trade by virtue of the rights and
privileges granted to them had not been
demonstrated, a view that was not shared by other
countries.
As a means of ensuring that trade-distorting practices
of STEs are eliminated, disciplines relating to
exporting STEs will extend to the future use of
monopoly powers so that such powers cannot be
exercised in any way that would circumvent the
direct disciplines on STEs on export.
These disciplines must be completed by April 30,
2006 as part of the modalities to be negotiated by
that date.  The measures must be implemented  in
such a way that the process is completed by the end
of 2013.  The purpose here is to promote a more
conducive climate so that these enterprises  open
themselves up to competition and their operations
fall in line with market practices.
B. Domestic support
Few were the results agreed upon with respect to this
pillar of the negotiation.  It should be noted that it is
precisely to this area that most of the official aid
received by the producers in the developed countries
is channeled.
Noteworthy among the results of the Sixth WTO
Ministerial Conference was the decision whereby
there would be three bands for reductions in Final
Bound Total AMS and in the overall cut in trade-
distorting domestic support, with higher linear cuts
in higher bands.  In concrete terms this means that
the European Union would be in the top band, the
United States and Japan would be in the middle
band and all other Members, including all the
developing countries, would be in the bottom band.
Developed countries, like Switzerland, which have
high relative levels of AMS, but which are in the
bottom band, will make an additional effort in AMS
reduction.
It should be pointed out that the level of cuts in
domestic support for each of the bands referred to
must be established by April 30, 2006 as part of the
modalities to be negotiated.
The Declaration recognizes that there has been some
convergence concerning the reductions in Final
Bound Total AMS, the overall cut in trade-distorting
domestic support and in both product-specific and
non product-specific de minimis limits.
The Members commit to ensuring that the overall
reduction in trade-distorting domestic support will
be equal to or less than the sum of the reductions in
the amber, blue and de minimis box.  The aim here
is to prevent box shifting in any obligations assumed
by Members in relation to Domestic Support,
without any real reductions in the total amount of
trade-distorting support. 
Of concern is the fact that the Declaration makes no
mention of any criterion or orientation with regard
to the Blue Box.
Developing countries that do not have AMS
commitments will be exempt from the cuts in the de
minimis level and the overall cut in trade-distorting
domestic support.
The criteria in the Green Box will be examined to
ensure that their impact  will have no or minimal
effects on international trade and the programs of
developing countries will effectively be included in
that box.
C. Market Access
Here too, the Conference yielded less than
significant results on this pillar of the negotiation,
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which is the area in which trade liberalization
would have the greatest benefits for all Members
–both developed and developing countries alike –
and would have the greatest impact on production
and agricultural world trade.
The Members adopted four bands for structuring
tariff cuts, recognizing that there is need at this
time to agree on the relevant thresholds, including
those applicable for developing country Members.
The text of the Declaration mentions, with varying
degrees of specificity, some areas of flexibility with
regard to market access.  It recognizes that the
issue of the treatment of sensitive products is still
pending, but remains silent on possible increases in
tariff quotas, which would be an integral part of
the substantial improvements in market access in
these negotiations –which should give cause for
concern. 
The Declaration is not forthcoming on the issue of
preference erosion which goes hand in hand with
trade liberalization, or other issues such as tropical
products and products of particular importance to
the diversification of production from the growing
of illicit narcotic crops. 
It accepts that the developing country mechanisms
will have the flexibility to self-designate an
appropriate number of tariff lines as Special
Products guided by indicators based on the criteria
of food security, livelihood security and rural
development. It also acknowledges the right that
developing countries will have to recourses to a
Special Safeguard Mechanism based on import
quantity and price triggers, with precise
arrangements to be further defined. 
With regard to the least developed countries
Annex 7 of the Declaration agrees –which could be
considered another concrete and important result
of this Conference – that developed countries and
developing countries that declare themselves to be
in a position to do so – would grant duty-free and
quota-free market access for at least 97% of
products originating from LDCs, defined at the
tariff line level, by 2008, or no later than the start
of the implementation period. This latter
clarification contemplates a scenario where the
negotiations could be delayed after 2008, which
could in itself be a bad sign for a commitment to a
conclusion of the Round in 2006. 
The fact that some developed countries, the
United States and Japan, especially, have indicated
that they face difficulties in granting access for
products originating in the LDCa to their markets
and have finally accepted the 97% figure, could
give cause for reflection when evaluating the real
meaning of this concession.  According to some
estimates, this 3% reserve could mean that these
countries could exempt from this treatment
between 250 and 330 tariff lines, including, of
course, the more sensitive products, such as textiles
and sugar, in the case of the United States, and rice
and leather, in the case of Japan. In view of the fact
that exports from the least advanced countries are
concentrated in a few headings, one might deduce
that these exceptions could significantly reduce the
value of the commitment assumed.
Finally, with regard to the issue of market access, it
would seem that there is a clear awareness among
Members that much remains to be done.  The
Ministers therefore decided to intensify efforts on
pending issues in order to establish the modalities
in this pillar by April 30, 2006.
III. Negotiations on Cotton
In view of the notoriously sluggish progress of
these negotiations and the attendant frustration to
which this situation has given rise among
developing countries in general and, very
specifically, among the four African co-sponsors of
the cotton initiative, it is no wonder that this topic
became a priority at the Hong Kong Conference.
The Ministerial Declaration makes a number of
decisions in this regard.  First, the countries
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undertake to eliminate all forms of export
subsidies for cotton in 2006.  This measure applies
to the United States, especially, since other
developed countries do not subsidize cotton
exports.
This commitment means that the United States must
eliminate its step 2 export subsidy programs as well
as any other type of hidden subsidization in the
export credit guarantees that the United States
extends to its producers.  It should be noted that in
a recent judgment by the WTO Appellate Body,
these programs were considered to be incompatible
with the obligations assumed by this country in the
WTO and should, consequently, be modified
anyhow.
With respect to market access, the developed
countries will give duty- and quota-free access for
cotton exports from least-developed countries
(LDCs) from the commencement of the
implementation period. The benefits of this
concession, promoted by the United States are
relative for the African countries, since they
do not export cotton to that market. It could
be more important in other markets where they
compete with cotton exports subsidized by the
United States.
With regard to domestic support, which accounts for
85 per cent of the official support that producers in
the United States receive (close to US$4 billion in
2004, and which is the measure that most distorts
cotton production and trade worldwide, the results
were much less significant.
The recognized objective is that, as an outcome of
the negotiations, trade distorting domestic subsidies
for cotton production be reduced more ambitiously
than under whatever general formula is agreed upon
and that it should be implemented over a shorter
period of time than generally applicable.  This means
that decisions cannot be taken with regard to the
extent and pace of the reductions in domestic aid for
cotton until the general modalities for reducing that
support for other agricultural products has been
established.
With regard to the development assistance aspects
of cotton, the Declaration urges the Director
General to explore with bilateral donors and with
multilateral and regional institutions the possibility
of establishing, through such institutions, a
mechanism to deal with income declines in
the cotton sector; to increase technical and financial
assistance, technology transfer and South-South
cooperation.
IV. Banana
This topic is not part of the Declaration.  However,
it was the focus of much attention and polemical
debate at the Conference and could potentially have
torpedoed it.  It is, moreover, a topic that could not
be absent from a document that talks about
Agriculture in the Americas, given the enormous
interest that this commodity holds for many
countries of the region.
The existing disagreement between South American,
Central American countries and the United States,
on the one hand, and the European Union and the
African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP), on
the other, is well known and has a long history
within the WTO.
The core issue is the transition for the European
Union to an import regime with a single tariff
of EUR 176 per tonne, to enter into effect on
January 1, 2006.  The Latin American countries
feel that the application of such a high tariff
(compared to EUR 75 at present) would have
very negative consequences on their current share
in the world banana market.  On the other hand,
the ACP countries, which enjoy free access to
the EU market, fear that any reduction in that
tariff could affect their interests.
Finally, the parties opted to continue consultations
on the topic with the “good intervention” of the
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway, who was the
facilitator in the conflict in Hong Kong.
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V. The Issue of Coherence 
and its Link to Aid for Trade
The document “The Agriculture of the Americas in
the Context of the Doha Development Agenda”,
prepared prior to the Hong Kong meeting and
submitted by IICA at the Sixth         WTO Ministerial
Conference, makes some preliminary reflections
–which coincide with what we have been saying for
over a year—regarding the need to take this concept
of coherence and coordination among international
organizations to a more operational phase so
as to more effectively meet the trade needs of
developing countries. The document suggest
that any future Agreement on Agriculture that
emerges from the current negotiations could
serve as an experimental platform to develop
this new concept.  If successful, this experience
could then be extended to other spheres of the
negotiation.
In this regard, one cannot help being pleased with
the Ministerial Declaration with regard to
Coherence, Aid for Trade and the Integrated
Framework.  Undoubtedly these initiatives could
be a valuable complement to the objectives
for more effective growth and development
and a more effective footing for the developing
countries in the world economy. 
We need however to insist on the need to be more
single-minded and effective if, indeed, the aim is
that these negotiations should take fully into
account the specific needs, problems and
conditions of the developing countries to enable
them to develop competitive agriculture and
participate increasingly in international trade. 
As maintained in that document, clearly the WTO
does not have the competencies, or the capability
to be able to address and solve on its own many of
the problems that have been posed in the
agricultural negotiations. 
However, other organizations, such as the FAO,
UNCTAD, the ITC, the World Bank, IMF, IICA
and many other regional organizations have
mandates, human and financial resources and
the technical capability to support the developing
countries’ efforts to find solutions to the
complex problems and challenges they face.  The
time has come to take advantage of the clear
complementarities that exist among these
organizations so that they can propose a
coordinated response and engage in joint action. 
What this new operational concept of “coherence”
proposes is simply that the Agreement on
Agriculture being negotiated in the WTO, with
clearly defined objectives and guidelines,  should
not only reflect commitments, obligations and
measures that the WTO is in a position to
implement, but rather that  these should extend
to other international organizations that
have competencies and the capability to implement
them.
That joint participation in the fulfillment of the
commitments agreed upon would not only provide
a more effective response to the various problems
and concerns relating to the 149 Members that
make up that organization, but also would result in
increased interest and participation on the part of
many countries in the negotiations.
Thus, if these joint efforts on the part of the
international and regional institutions lead
to the desired objective, they will be contributing
in large measure to making this Round qualify
justifiably, in the final analysis, as the Development
Round.
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